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ABSTRACT 
  The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s 
(RLUIPA) equal terms provision prohibits government from 
implementing a land-use regulation in a manner that treats religious 
assemblies and institutions less favorably than secular assemblies and 
institutions. Lower courts have only begun to interpret and apply 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision, but already they have significantly 
weakened its protections of religious liberty by giving the provision 
unnecessarily restrictive interpretations. Not surprisingly, in light of 
the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), the lower courts’ restrictive readings 
seem driven by concerns that a broader interpretation would exceed 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Yet the lower 
courts’ concerns about the constitutionality of a broader interpretation 
are misplaced, and their restrictive readings of the equal terms 
provision severely weaken RLUIPA’s protections of religious liberty. 
This Note argues that a textual interpretation of the provision, which 
would strictly prohibit unequal treatment of religious assemblies and 
institutions as compared to secular assemblies and institutions, falls 
within Congress’s prophylactic power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, a textual interpretation is more 
consistent with Congress’s intent to broadly protect religious liberty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the historic town of Goldsboro, North Carolina, churches—
not shops and restaurants—occupy many of the downtown 
storefronts.1 On a short stretch of Walnut Street alone, there are five 
storefront churches. City officials with an eye toward downtown 
revitalization and economic development have debated whether 
permitting churches to locate in these downtown storefronts is 
consistent with plans for downtown growth.2 On one hand, churches 
provide a stable source of rental income for many downtown building 
owners who might otherwise struggle to find tenants.3 On the other 
hand, opponents of the storefront churches argue that tax-exempt 
churches contribute little to the downtown tax base and can stymie 
efforts to open downtown bars and restaurants because of regulations 
prohibiting alcohol sales within fifty feet of schools and places of 
worship.4 
Goldsboro’s zoning ordinance permits places of worship to 
locate downtown, though it requires every place of worship to locate 
at least one hundred feet from the next.5 Officials in other cities, 
frustrated by weak downtown tax bases and impediments to 
downtown revitalization, have banned churches from the downtown 
district altogether.6 For example, another small town in North 
Carolina adopted a temporary ban on churches in its downtown area 
 
 1. For a discussion of the role of storefront churches in economically depressed areas, see 
generally OMAR MCROBERTS, STREETS OF GLORY: CHURCH AND COMMUNITY IN A BLACK 
URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (2003). 
 2. Anessa Myers, Storefront Churches Not Part of City Plans, GOLDSBORO NEWS-ARGUS 
(N.C.), Aug. 18, 2008, at 1A, available at http://www.newsargus.com/news/archives/2008/08/18/ 
storefront_churches_not_part_of_city_plans. 
 3. See id. (noting that building owners often have no other choice but to rent to churches 
because “[t]here are [sic] not a crowd of people clamoring for space downtown”). 
 4. Id. Some Goldsboro Planning Commission members appeared fed up with the 
churches’ failure to contribute to the downtown tax base. For example, one commission 
member commented that “(Churches) are killing the tax base downtown,” id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Chris Boyette, Chairman, Goldsboro Planning Commission), and another 
member agreed that he had seen “enough churches downtown,” id. (quoting Hal Keck, 
Member, Goldsboro Planning Commission). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., ROBBINSDALE, MINN., CODE § 521.01 (1998) (defining the “Downtown 
District” as permitting retail and commercial uses but not churches); see also Christine 
Dempsey, Plan Bans New Churches Downtown, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Nov. 18, 2003, 
at B5 (reporting that the zoning commission approved a proposal to prohibit additional 
churches from locating in the downtown district). 
CAMPBELL IN FINAL.DOC 3/16/2009  3:22:17 PM 
2009] RLUIPA’S EQUAL TERMS PROVISION 1073 
in 2006.7 City leaders argue that such bans are necessary to promote 
economic development, but churches and other places of worship 
excluded from downtown districts have frequently turned to the 
courts, alleging that the bans, or similarly restrictive zoning 
ordinances, discriminate on the basis of religion. Religious groups 
opposing the bans often rely on the equal terms provision of the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to 
advance statutory claims against the city or county responsible for the 
zoning practices. 
Congress enacted RLUIPA in 2000 to protect the religious 
liberty of persons facing land-use restrictions, as well as prisoners and 
other institutionalized persons.8 RLUIPA’s land-use provisions 
protect individuals, religious assemblies, and religious institutions 
against two main categories of government action. First, RLUIPA 
prohibits land-use regulations that substantially burden religious 
liberty (the substantial burden provision).9 Second, RLUIPA 
prohibits land-use regulations that treat unequally, discriminate 
against, exclude, or unreasonably limit religious groups.10 RLUIPA’s 
equal terms provision appears in the second category of protections. 
It prohibits governments from “impos[ing] or implement[ing] a land 
use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or 
institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution.”11 
Much of the debate over the proper interpretation of RLUIPA’s 
land-use provisions has centered on the act’s substantial burden 
provision. In the years following RLUIPA’s passage, courts have 
struggled to define what it means to substantially burden one’s 
 
 7. Emily Bazar, N.C. Town Struggles to Keep Downtown Thriving, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 
2006, at 2A (explaining that Kenly City Council members wanted to “revive the town’s 
struggling downtown district and create a lively, prosperous business sector”). 
 8. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006)). Congress proclaimed 
that it was an act “[t]o protect religious liberty, and for other purposes.” Id. 
 9. RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision prohibits government from “impos[ing] or 
implement[ing] a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C.  
§ 2000cc(a)(1). The provision further provides that such a regulation is not prohibited if it “(A) 
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id. §§ 2000cc(a)(1). 
 10. The three provisions falling in this category are the equal terms provision, id.  
§ 2000cc(b)(1), the nondiscrimination provision, id. § 2000cc(b)(2), and the exclusions and limits 
provision, id. § 2000cc(b)(3). 
 11. Id. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
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religion.12 Although RLUIPA plaintiffs use the equal terms provision 
less frequently than the substantial burden provision,13 courts have 
had just as many problems interpreting it. Specifically, courts have 
split on two important issues. The first involves how to establish 
unequal treatment: should religious assemblies and institutions be 
compared to all secular assemblies and institutions or only to similarly 
situated secular assemblies and institutions? The second is what level 
of scrutiny is appropriate for instances of unequal treatment. 
The only two circuit courts that have addressed both issues—the 
Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit14—have reached contrary 
conclusions to both questions. In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, 
Inc. v. City of Long Branch,15 the Third Circuit held that equal terms 
plaintiffs must show that a religious assembly or institution was 
treated on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution that is “similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose.”16 
The Third Circuit further held that once that burden is met, the 
government is strictly liable for violations of the provision.17 In other 
words, the unequal treatment is prohibited even if the government 
could show that its actions were narrowly tailored to achieve a 
 
 12. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the key inquiry under the substantial burden provision is whether the land-use 
regulation “directly coerces the religious institution to change its behavior”); Guru Nanak Sikh 
Soc’y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 
“oppressive to a significantly great extent” test is more lenient than the Seventh Circuit’s 
effectively impracticable test); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 
(11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “a ‘substantial burden’ must place more than an inconvenience on 
religious exercise” and is “akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious 
adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly”); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of 
Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[F]or a land use regulation to impose a 
‘substantial burden,’ it must be ‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent. . . . [or] impose a 
significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.”); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers 
(CLUB) v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) ( “[A] land-use regulation that imposes 
a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that . . . render[s] religious exercise . . . 
effectively impracticable.”). 
 13. See Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications and 
Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 815 
(2006) (noting that § 2000cc(b), which includes the equal terms provision, has been “seldom 
used by plaintiffs”). 
 14. The Seventh Circuit has addressed the first issue, but not the second. This Note does 
not discuss the Seventh Circuit cases in detail because the analysis for both issues is largely 
intertwined. 
 15. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 16. Id. at 266. 
 17. Id. at 269. 
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compelling government interest. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit 
held in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside18 that the “natural 
perimeter” for comparison is the broader category of assemblies or 
institutions, and that the statute does not require any further showing 
of similarity.19 Midrash Sephardi further held that unequal treatment 
is prohibited unless the government can show that the land-use 
regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.20 
Although disagreeing as to which free exercise principles should 
be part of the equal terms analysis, both the Third Circuit and the 
Eleventh Circuit added requirements not found in the plain terms of 
the provision. Courts appear reluctant to adhere to the plain text of 
the equal terms provision—which lacks both a similarly situated 
requirement and a compelling interest test—because they are wary of 
interpreting the provision in a manner that would exceed Congress’s 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. By grafting additional 
requirements onto the equal terms provision, courts ensure that the 
provision is simply a codification of existing free exercise principles 
rather than a more ambitious attempt to prevent or remedy 
constitutional violations in a specific context with a demonstrated 
history of unconstitutional land-use discrimination. 
This Note argues that by adding requirements to the equal terms 
provision that are neither commanded nor invited by the text or 
structure of the statute, courts have weakened RLUIPA’s protections 
for religious liberty and overlooked serious concerns. Although a 
limited form of similarly situated analysis may be necessary for as-
applied equal terms challenges to establish unequal treatment, the 
Third Circuit’s “similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose” 
requirement seriously distorts Congress’s intent in enacting RLUIPA 
by immunizing the government’s regulatory aims from judicial 
scrutiny. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s application of strict 
scrutiny analysis contradicts settled canons of statutory construction 
and discredits Congress’s implicit judgment that there is no 
permissible reason for treating religious assemblies and institutions 
on less than equal terms than secular assemblies and institutions. 
Importantly, the lower courts have failed to explain why interpreting 
the provision according to its plain terms would exceed Congress’s 
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. This Note argues 
 
 18. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 19. Id. at 1231. 
 20. Id. at 1235. 
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that a textual interpretation of RLUIPA’s equal terms provision 
would not exceed Congress’s legislative authority. To the contrary, 
such an interpretation would fall well within Congress’s Section 5 
authority as defined in City of Boerne v. Flores21 and would vindicate 
Congress’s intent to remedy a demonstrated record of discriminatory 
land-use regulation. 
Part I briefly recounts the circumstances leading up to Congress’s 
enactment of RLUIPA and then summarizes the impetus for and 
legislative history surrounding RLUIPA’s equal terms provision. Part 
II describes the circuit split regarding the proper construction of the 
equal terms provision and discusses the ramifications of the lower 
courts’ decisions. Finally, Part III proposes dispensing with both the 
similarly situated requirement and compelling interest test in favor of 
a textual interpretation of the equal terms provision to prevent 
diluting RLUIPA’s religious liberty protections. 
I.  HOW RLUIPA BECAME THE LAW 
This Part summarizes the tumultuous events leading up to 
RLUIPA’s enactment, discusses the legislative history relevant to 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision, and then briefly describes the 
substantive content and structure of RLUIPA’s land-use provisions. 
A. The Path from Sherbert to Boerne 
Congress’s enactment of RLUIPA is the latest chapter in a ten-
year struggle between Congress and the Court to determine the 
extent to which religious liberties are protected from government 
regulation. Until 1990, courts evaluated laws that infringed on 
religious liberty under the balancing test established by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.22 Under this balancing test, the 
Free Exercise Clause prevented government from applying a law—
even a neutral and generally applicable law—in a manner that 
substantially burdened an individual’s religious liberty unless that law 
 
 21. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 22. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that South 
Carolina could not constitutionally apply its unemployment benefits statute to deny benefits to 
an individual who refused employment because it would require her to work on Saturday. Id. at 
410. 
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was justified by a compelling state interest.23 In 1990, Employment 
Division v. Smith24 rejected that balancing test and held that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not prevent the government from establishing 
neutral laws of general applicability that only incidentally affect 
religious liberty.25 Under Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws 
must only survive rational basis review even if religious liberties were 
infringed as a result of the general application of the law.26 
The congressional response to Smith was swift, direct, and 
overwhelmingly bipartisan.27 In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)28 with the express purpose 
of overturning Smith and “restor[ing] the compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.”29 RFRA applied to all government 
actions, including actions of state and local governments.30 
Congress relied on its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for the legislative authority to enforce 
RFRA against the states.31 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
 
 23. Id. at 406–07 (evaluating whether South Carolina had a compelling interest in denying 
unemployment benefits to an individual who refused a job because of her adherence to a 
Saturday Sabbath). 
 24. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 25. Id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him 
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence 
contradicts that proposition.”). Smith upheld an Oregon law that prohibited consuming peyote. 
Native Americans alleged that the law infringed on their religious liberty because they used 
peyote in religious rituals. The Court held that Oregon could dismiss state employees caught 
using the drug even if the employees’ use occurred during religious rituals because the law did 
not target religious beliefs but rather was neutral and generally applicable. Id. at 890. 
 26. Id. at 885–88. 
 27. The bill, H.R. 1308, had 170 cosponsors, was passed by a voice vote in the House of 
Representatives, 139 CONG. REC. 9,687 (1993), and was passed as amended in the Senate by a 
vote of 97 to 3, 139 CONG. REC. 26,416 (1993). 
 28. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). RFRA says that “Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). Subsection (b) 
then establishes that a substantial burden on free exercise is only permissible if the burden 
furthers a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (explaining that the purpose of the act is to restore Sherbert’s 
compelling interest test and “to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened”). 
 30. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516 (describing RFRA’s application to state and local 
governments). 
 31. Id. 
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states from making or enforcing laws that (1) “abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States;” (2) “deprive [a] 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;” or  
(3) “deny to [a] person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”32 Section 5 of the Amendment gives Congress the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions “by appropriate 
legislation.”33 
Just four years after Congress enacted RFRA, however, the 
Supreme Court struck down the law as applied to state and local 
governments34 on the basis that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 
authority to regulate the states.35 In the landmark decision of City of 
Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that RFRA did not enforce existing 
constitutional rights, but instead attempted to “decree the substance” 
of the Constitution’s free exercise right.36 According to the Court, 
RFRA swept broadly to prohibit constitutionally permissible state 
and local regulatory prerogatives and lacked a “congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and 
the means adopted to that end.”37 
The Court repeatedly criticized Congress for failing to 
demonstrate a factual basis for its conclusion that sweeping 
preventative or remedial legislation was needed to address 
widespread religious discrimination. Though Congress held hearings 
when enacting RFRA, the Court noted that “RFRA’s legislative 
record lack[ed] examples of modern instances of generally applicable 
 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 33. Id. amend. XIV, § 5. In contrast to the Thirteenth Amendment, which gives Congress 
the authority to regulate private conduct, Congress may only regulate state and local 
governments pursuant to its Section 5 power. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 292–93 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that Congress can only 
regulate state and local governments under its Section 5 power). 
 34. Subsequent cases have clarified that Boerne did not invalidate RFRA as applied to the 
federal government. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 126 S. 
Ct. 1211, 1216 (2006) (applying RFRA to the Federal Controlled Substances Act). 
 35. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535. 
 36. Id. at 519 (“Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be 
said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing 
what the right is.”). 
 37. Id. at 520, 532, 536 (“RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if 
those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional 
protections.”). 
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laws passed because of religious bigotry.”38 The Court contrasted 
RFRA’s sparse legislative record with the voluminous evidence of 
discriminatory voting restrictions that supported Congress’s 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.39 Whereas the Voting 
Rights Act “prohibit[ed] certain types of laws” that Congress 
believed to “have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional,” 
the Court held that RFRA was an attempt to substantively alter 
constitutional rights.40 
After Boerne, the message from the Court to Congress was clear: 
if Congress wishes to protect religious liberty by regulating the states 
pursuant to its Section 5 power to enact prophylactic legislation to 
prevent or remedy discrimination, it must ensure that the legislation 
is a congruent and proportional response to widespread 
discrimination.41 
B.  Congress Tries Again: The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act 
The Court’s decision in Boerne sent Congress back to the 
drawing board. Less than one month after the Court handed down 
the opinion, the House of Representatives held the first of a series of 
hearings entitled “Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. 
Flores” to consider what alternative sources of legislative authority 
were available to Congress.42 Mindful that the Court had criticized 
Congress’s failure to establish an adequate record of discrimination to 
 
 38. Id. at 530. 
 39. See id. at 525 (noting “evidence in the record reflecting the subsisting and pervasive 
discriminatory—and therefore unconstitutional—use of literacy tests”). 
 40. Id. at 532. 
 41. Although the message may have been explicit, the congruent and proportional 
standard established by the Court was not. Scholars have lamented the ambiguity inherent in 
the standard that Congress is required to follow. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 
YALE L.J. 441, 458 (2000) (discussing the Boerne test’s ambiguity). 
 42. See Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Rep. Canady, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on 
the Constitution) (“Because the freedom to practice one’s religion is a fundamental right, we 
are meeting this morning in the wake of Boerne to consider what sources of authority Congress 
may utilize to protect this most precious freedom from governmental infringement.”). Two 
other hearings followed. Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part II): Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998); Protecting Religious Freedom After 
Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998). 
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support its Section 5 enactment of RFRA,43 this time Congress made 
a concerted effort to hold hearings and otherwise gather recent 
examples of intentional religious discrimination.44 
1. Establishing a Record of Discrimination.  The hearings held in 
response to Boerne, and in association with subsequent religious 
liberties legislation,45 featured extensive testimony from religious 
leaders, constitutional law scholars, and practicing attorneys.46 One of 
these witnesses, Professor Douglas Laycock, suggested to Congress 
that Supreme Court and lower court decisions subsequent to 
Employment Division v. Smith continued to apply strict scrutiny to 
laws involving individualized assessments or targeting religious 
conduct.47 Because such laws must survive strict scrutiny analysis, as 
 
 43. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–32 (“In contrast to the record which confronted Congress 
and the Judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA’s legislative record lacks examples of modern 
instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of 
persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 
40 years.”). 
 44. Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the Constitutionality of 
Religious Protection Measures: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
(1999); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999); Religious Liberty Protection 
Act of 1998: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 Senate Hearing]; 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Religious Liberty Protection Act 
of 1998 House Hearing]; Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part III), supra 
note 42; Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part II), supra note 42; Protecting 
Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores, supra note 42. 
 45. RLUIPA was “patterned after an earlier, more expansive bill, H.R. 1691.” 146 CONG. 
REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). Although H.R. 1691 was the subject of “several 
committee hearings, two markups, and the filing of a Committee Report,” RLUIPA “passed the 
Senate and the House without committee action and by unanimous consent.” Id. Therefore, 
with the exception of the section-by-section analysis submitted by Rep. Canady after the vote, 
RLUIPA “is not accompanied by any recorded legislative history.” Id. Because RLUIPA was 
“patterned after” the earlier Religious Liberty Protection Act, the hearings and committee 
report cast light on Congress’s motivations in passing RLUIPA. 
 46. See, e.g., Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning 
Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 984–85 (2001) (noting that Congress held nine hearings 
over a three-year period, and describing the evidence presented to Congress). In one hearing 
alone, Congress heard from seventeen witnesses including law professors, religious leaders, and 
practicing attorneys. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 House Hearing, supra note 44, 
at iii (listing witnesses). 
 47. See Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores, supra note 42, at 51 
(statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor, Associate Dean for Research, University of Texas 
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opposed to just rational basis review, they are more likely to violate 
the Free Exercise Clause than neutral laws of general applicability.48 
RLUIPA’s legislative record contains numerous accounts of 
state and local laws evincing discrimination against religion, as well as 
laws with exemptions and individual assessments. Local zoning laws 
were among those most frequently cited.49 For example, the rabbi of a 
Los Angeles congregation explained that even though the city 
“willingly grant[ed] permits and ma[de] accommodations for many 
other secular uses in the area [such as private clubs and schools],” it 
prohibited religious uses in the same zone.50 Professor Laycock 
testified that the zoning law in Rolling Hills Estates, California, 
banned churches from commercial zones and only conditionally 
permitted them in the institutional zone but made “extensive 
provision for places of secular assembly, including public and private 
schools, government buildings, public and private clubs, recreational 
centers, movie theaters, live theaters, clubs for games with spectator 
seating, and many others.”51 
Although much of the evidence presented to Congress was 
anecdotal, Congress also considered a study by Brigham Young 
University scholars, which drew empirical conclusions by evaluating 
church zoning cases.52 The study indicated that small religious groups 
 
Law School) (describing the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). 
 48. Id. at 52 (noting that many state and local laws may violate the Free Exercise Clause 
based on Lukumi’s requirement that laws lacking neutrality and general applicability be 
evaluated under strict scrutiny). 
 49. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18 (1999) (“Hearings before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution in the 105th and 106th Congresses provide a substantial record of evidence 
indicating a widespread pattern of religious discrimination in land use regulation.”). 
 50. Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part II), supra note 42, at 33 
(statement of Chaim Rubin, Rabbi, Congregation Etz Chaim in Los Angeles, California). 
 51. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, supra note 44, at 110 (statement of Douglas 
Laycock, Professor, Associate Dean for Research, University of Texas Law School). 
 52. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 20 (noting that the Subcommittee on the Constitution 
“heard testimony regarding a study conducted at Brigham Young University finding that Jews, 
small Christian denominations, and nondenominational churches are vastly over represented in 
reported church zoning cases”). But a number of scholars have criticized the study both for 
being outdated and empirically unsound. See, e.g., Carolina R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional 
Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s 
Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361, 2397–
400 (2002) (describing methodological flaws in the Brigham Young study); Ariel Graff, 
Comment, Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment, and Land Use 
Regulation: Is RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 485, 498–503 (2005) (criticizing Congress’s evidence of discrimination in land use cases); 
see also Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning Process, 
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comprise a disproportionately high percentage of all zoning litigants, 
suggesting that nonmainstream religious groups are particularly 
susceptible to discrimination through zoning laws.53 On the basis of 
both the anecdotal and empirical evidence before it, the Committee 
on the Judiciary found that land-use regulations often discriminate on 
the basis of religion and that zoning laws are “commonly 
administered through individualized processes not controlled by 
neutral and generally applicable rules.”54 The Committee concluded 
that legislative action was warranted “as a means of remedying these 
abuses of the First Amendment right to free exercise.”55 
2. Motivation for the Equal Terms Provision.  RLUIPA’s 
legislative history indicates that Congress enacted the equal terms 
provision in response to evidence that religious land uses are often 
treated less favorably than similar secular land uses, both on the face 
of zoning ordinances and in their application. The committee 
specifically pointed to zoning codes in the suburbs of Chicago that 
applied different rules to religious assemblies than to nonreligious 
assemblies.56 According to the committee, these codes allowed “uses 
such as banquet halls, clubs, community centers, funeral parlors, 
fraternal organizations, health clubs, gyms, places of amusement, 
recreation centers, lodges, libraries, museums, municipal buildings, 
meeting halls, and theaters,” while excluding, or at least requiring a 
special-use permit, for similar religious assemblies.57 
Thus, when Congress enacted RLUIPA’s equal terms provision, 
it was responding to subtle religious discrimination evidenced by the 
unequal treatment of religious assemblies and secular assemblies.58 
 
116 YALE L.J. 859, 868 (2007) (arguing that results from a study of New Haven, Connecticut 
zoning decisions “lend empirical support to the claim that pervasive discrimination against 
churches does not exist in the context of land use”). 
 53. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 20–21 (summarizing the results of the Brigham Young 
study). 
 54. Id. at 24. 
 55. Id. at 23. 
 56. Id. at 19. 
 57. Id. at 19–20. The Committee pointed out that “[o]ne explanation suggested for this 
disparate treatment was that local officials may not want non-tax-generating property taking up 
space where tax-generating property could locate.” Id. at 20. 
 58. See id. at 24 (“Many cities overtly exclude churches, others do so subtly. The motive is 
not always easily discernible, but the result is a consistent, widespread pattern of political and 
governmental resistance to a core feature of religious exercise: the ability to assemble for 
worship.”). The Committee specifically noted that “[c]hurches are often refused permission to 
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Implicit in the equal terms provision is a judgment that the only 
possible basis for disparate treatment of religious and secular 
assemblies is bias against religion. Zoning codes or zoning board 
decisions that accommodated secular uses while excluding similar 
religious uses were, in Congress’s view, inherently discriminatory and 
therefore not neutral or generally applicable. The equal terms 
provision reflects Congress’s judgment that this particular type of 
government action—unequal treatment of religious and secular 
assemblies—was egregious enough to warrant direct prohibition and 
“more precise standards than the substantial burden and compelling 
interest tests” found in the substantial burden provision.59 
C.   The Finished Product: The Equal Terms Provision in Context 
RLUIPA contains two substantive sections, one addressing land-
use regulations, and the other addressing institutionalized persons.60 
 
meet in buildings designed for meetings, and in which secular meetings have been permitted.” 
Id. 
 59. 146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (noting, in the section-by-
section analysis of RLUIPA, that the equal terms provision “directly address[es] some of the 
more egregious forms of land use regulation, and provide[s] more precise standards than the 
substantial burden and compelling interest tests”). 
 60. RLUIPA’s land-use regulations read as follows: 
§ 2000cc. Protection of land use as religious exercise 
(a) Substantial burdens 
(1) General rule 
  No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a 
religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition 
of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution— 
  (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
  (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest. 
(2) Scope of application 
  This subsection applies in any case in which— 
  (A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives 
Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability; 
  (B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would 
affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or 
  (C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use 
regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has 
in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to 
make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved. 
(b) Discrimination and exclusion 
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The equal terms provision is best viewed in context with RLUIPA’s 
other land-use provisions because the text and structure of RLUIPA 
provide important signals regarding the proper interpretation of each 
individual provision. RLUIPA’s land-use provisions are organized 
into two main sections: section (a), which contains the substantial 
burden provision, and section (b), which contains the equal terms 
provision as its first subsection. 
RLUIPA’s section (b) includes three separate provisions, the 
first being the equal terms provision. The section (b) provisions are 
conceptually distinct from section (a)’s substantial burden provision 
in that they “rest on claims of religious equality, not privilege.”61 
Whereas the substantial burden provision privileges religion by 
prohibiting government from placing substantial burdens on religious 
exercise, the equal terms provision reflects an “alternative 
jurisprudential understanding of religious liberty” by requiring 
equality of treatment instead of privileged treatment.62 
In contrast to the substantial burden provision, the text of the 
equal terms provision does not require that the unequal treatment 
substantially burden religious exercise to prove a violation. Nor does 
the equal terms provision contain the jurisdictional limitations of the 
substantial burden provision. Furthermore, the plain terms of the 
equal terms provision appear to completely prohibit unequal 
treatment. Whereas the substantial burden provision explicitly 
 
(1) Equal terms 
  No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious 
assembly or institution. 
(2) Nondiscrimination 
  No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that 
discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious 
denomination. 
(3) Exclusions and limits 
  No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that— 
  (A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or 
  (B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a 
jurisdiction. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 61. Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After 
Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 864 (2000). 
 62. Id.; see also id. at 864–65 (explaining that the discrimination and exclusion provisions of 
section (b) “represent[] not only alternative grounds for protection but an alternative 
jurisprudential understanding of religious liberty,” and noting that the section’s provisions “rest 
on claims of religious equality, not privilege”). 
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provides that substantial burdens on religion are prohibited unless 
they survive the compelling interest test, the equal terms provision 
prohibits all unequal treatment without exception. 
To summarize, the structure of RLUIPA’s land-use provisions 
suggests operative independence between section (a)—the substantial 
burden provision—and section (b), which includes the equal terms 
provision. According to its plain terms, the equal terms provision 
prohibits any land-use regulation that treats a religious assembly or 
institution on less than equal terms with a secular assembly or 
institution. The text of the statute does not indicate that Congress 
intended to apply the substantial burden requirement, the compelling 
interest test, or the jurisdictional limits from section (a) to the 
provisions in section (b). Nevertheless, lower courts interpreting the 
equal terms provision have been troubled by whether, and to what 
extent, section (a)’s requirements should be applied to the equal 
terms provision in section (b). Uncertainty regarding the 
constitutionality of the equal terms provision has further complicated 
what, on the surface, appears to be a relatively easy question of 
statutory interpretation. 
II.  THE EQUAL TERMS PROVISION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Lower courts interpreting the equal terms provision have 
encountered several interpretive dilemmas, but only two are 
pertinent to this Note.63 First, courts have considered whether the 
equal terms provision contains a similarly situated requirement. The 
Third Circuit held that “a regulation will violate the Equal Terms 
 
 63. Courts have considered two additional interpretive questions that are not central to this 
Note’s argument. The first is whether equal terms plaintiffs are required to show a substantial 
burden on religious exercise to prove an equal terms violation. The second is whether section 
(a)’s jurisdictional requirements should apply to the equal terms provision. All courts that have 
considered the first question have agreed showing a substantial burden is not required. See, e.g., 
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he structure of the statute and the legislative history clearly reveal that the substantial 
burden requirement does not apply to claims under . . . the Equal Terms provision.”); 
Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
proof of a substantial burden is not required for an equal terms violation). The Eleventh Circuit 
has twice raised the second interpretive question and suggested that the jurisdictional limits do 
not apply, but it has not found it necessary to resolve the question. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, 
Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229–30 (11th Cir. 2004) (“RLUIPA’s text and structure 
suggest that [the substantial burden provision’s] threshold jurisdictional test does not apply to 
[the] equal terms provision. . . . Because we find that the congregations allege conduct satisfying 
[the individualized assessment prong], we do not reach the question of whether they are 
required to satisfy this jurisdictional test.”). 
CAMPBELL IN FINAL.DOC 3/16/2009  3:22:17 PM 
1086 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1071 
provision only if it treats religious assemblies or institutions less well 
than secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated as to 
the regulatory purpose.”64 In contrast, the Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that the statute establishes the relevant comparison 
groups: religious assemblies and institutions are to be compared to 
secular assemblies and institutions to determine whether unequal 
treatment exists. Except for as-applied equal terms challenges, no 
further showing of similarity is required.65 
Second, courts have struggled to determine what level of 
scrutiny, if any, should apply when unequal treatment exists. The 
Third Circuit applies a strict liability standard. That is, “if a land-use 
regulation treats religious assemblies or institutions on less than equal 
terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions that are no less 
harmful to the governmental objectives in enacting the regulation, 
that regulation—without more—fails under RLUIPA.”66 The 
Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, applies strict scrutiny analysis.67 The 
following Sections more thoroughly describe the Third and Eleventh 
Circuits’ approaches and argue that both are unnecessarily narrow 
and contrary to congressional intent. 
A. The Third Circuit’s Approach 
In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long 
Branch, the Third Circuit considered whether Long Branch land-use 
regulations violated RLUIPA’s equal terms provision. Lighthouse, 
which described itself as “a Christian church that seeks to minister to 
the poor and disadvantaged in downtown Long Branch,” purchased 
property in a district zoned for commercial use.68 The city zoning 
ordinance permitted a variety of uses in commercial zones, including 
assembly halls, restaurants, movie theaters, colleges, and bowling 
 
 64. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 266. 
 65. See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1003 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that an equal terms plaintiff “need not demonstrate disparate treatment between two 
institutions similarly situated in all relevant respects, as required under equal protection 
jurisdiction,” but finding no unequal treatment when the church and school being compared 
were subject to different standards in different years); Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230 
(“[T]he relevant ‘natural perimeter’ for consideration with respect to RLUIPA’s prohibition is 
the category of ‘assemblies or institutions.’”). 
 66. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269. 
 67. See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1232 (“[A] violation of [the equal terms] provision, 
consistent with the analysis employed in Lukumi, must undergo strict scrutiny.”). 
 68. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 256–57 (quoting the description provided by the Lighthouse 
Institute for Evangelism). 
CAMPBELL IN FINAL.DOC 3/16/2009  3:22:17 PM 
2009] RLUIPA’S EQUAL TERMS PROVISION 1087 
alleys—but not churches.69 Lighthouse applied for a zoning permit to 
use the property as a church, but the city denied the permit because 
the ordinance did not permit churches in the commercial district.70 In 
response, Lighthouse sued the city, alleging constitutional and 
RLUIPA violations.71 
While the litigation was pending, Long Branch changed its 
zoning ordinance by adopting a redevelopment plan, purportedly to 
revitalize an underdeveloped area of the city.72 The plan designated 
the area where Lighthouse’s property was located a “‘Regional 
Entertainment / Commercial’ sector,” and permitted as primary uses 
theaters, cinemas, dance and art studios, and culinary schools, among 
others.73 It permitted bars, clubs, restaurants, and specialty retail 
stores as secondary uses.74 The plan prohibited churches, schools, and 
government buildings from locating in this sector.75 Lighthouse tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain a waiver from the zoning board.76 Lighthouse 
appealed the board’s decision to the city council, but was again 
denied.77 The city council reasoned that permitting a storefront church 
“‘would jeopardize’ the development of the Broadway area, which 
was envisioned as ‘an entertainment/commercial zone with businesses 
that are for profit.’”78 
After the second denial, Lighthouse filed an amended complaint, 
alleging that both the original ordinance and the new redevelopment 
plan violated the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA.79 The court held 
that Long Branch’s original zoning ordinance—but not the 
redevelopment plan—violated the equal terms provision.80 
 
 69. Id. at 257. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 258. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 259. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. The council further “found that a church would ‘destroy the ability of the block to 
be used as a high end entertainment and recreation area’ due to a New Jersey statute which 
prohibits the issuance of liquor licenses within two hundred feet of a house of worship.” Id. 
(quoting the findings of the Long Branch City Council). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 272–73. Because the court found a violation of RLUIPA, it did not reach 
Lighthouse’s free exercise claims. Id. at 273. 
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The Third Circuit explained that because Congress intended to 
codify free exercise jurisprudence, “the relevant analysis under the 
Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA must take into account the 
challenged regulations’ objectives.”81 Accordingly, equal terms 
plaintiffs in the Third Circuit must prove that a religious institution or 
assembly was treated on less than equal terms than a nonreligious 
assembly or institution “that is similarly situated as to the regulatory 
purpose.”82 Applying this construction of the equal terms provision to 
the Long Branch ordinance and redevelopment plan, the court found 
that because Long Branch had advanced no objectives for treating 
assembly halls differently than churches (and because no objectives 
were apparent), the ordinance violated the equal terms provision.83 
The redevelopment plan, however, did not violate the equal terms 
provision because churches are not similarly situated to the other 
allowed secular assemblies with respect to Long Branch’s goal of 
revitalizing an underdeveloped area of the town.84 The court’s finding 
that churches are not similarly situated relied on a state law that 
prohibited establishments serving liquor within a certain distance of 
churches.85 
Despite the court’s holding that Congress intended to codify free 
exercise jurisprudence—which, for laws that are not neutral and 
 
 81. Id. at 266. The Third Circuit explained that “[u]nder Free Exercise cases, the decision 
whether a regulation violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights hinges on a comparison of how it 
treats entities or behavior that have the same effect on its objectives.” Id. at 264. To support this 
assertion, the court pointed to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 265. In Lukumi, the 
Court found that a series of facially neutral ordinances banning animal sacrifices violated the 
Free Exercise Clause because, taken together, they impermissibly singled out for prohibition 
animal sacrifices performed as part of Santeria rituals. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547. There, the 
Court examined the effect of the ordinances in light of the government’s stated objectives to 
determine if the ordinances were actually neutral and of general applicability. See id. at 533–46 
(evaluating whether the ordinances were neutral and of general applicability). 
 82. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 266. 
 83. Id. at 272. 
 84. Id. at 270. 
 85. See id. (“It would be very difficult for Long Branch to create the kind of entertainment 
area envisaged by the Plan—one full of restaurants, bars, and clubs—if sizeable areas of the 
Broadway Corridor were not available for the issuance of liquor licenses.”). For the view that 
cities should not be permitted to use the existence of a state law as the basis for treating 
churches disparately, see Digrugilliers v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 616 
(7th Cir. 2007). In Digrugilliers, the court explained that “[g]overnment cannot, by granting 
churches special privileges (the right of a church official to reside in a building in a 
nonresidential district, or the right of the church to be free from offensive land uses in its 
vicinity), furnish the premise for excluding churches from otherwise suitable districts.” Id. 
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generally applicable, includes strict scrutiny analysis86—the Third 
Circuit rejected strict scrutiny analysis for violations of the equal 
terms provision, opting instead for a strict liability standard.87 The 
court explained that this deviation from free exercise principles was 
necessary because the “express language” of the equal terms 
provision signaled Congress’s intent that the provision “not include 
strict scrutiny.”88 
Even though Long Branch failed to argue that the equal terms 
provision would be unconstitutional under the interpretation 
advanced by Lighthouse (no similarly situated requirement and strict 
liability), the court nevertheless included a lengthy footnote 
explaining that its limiting construction avoided concerns about the 
constitutionality of the provision. The court cautioned that a more 
expansive interpretation of the provision (such as that urged by the 
dissent) could exceed Congress’s Section 5 authority.89 
Judge Jordan dissented from the majority’s view that equal terms 
plaintiffs must show unequal treatment of religious and secular 
assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated with respect to 
the regulatory objectives. He argued that the equal terms provision 
does not “require[] any greater similarity than is inherent in the broad 
terminology ‘assembly or institution.’”90 Importantly, Judge Jordan 
refuted the majority’s assertion that his interpretation would strip 
local governments of their ability to implement rational zoning 
policies. He pointed out that the equal terms provision does not 
prevent local governments from restricting land use; it simply requires 
 
 86. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or 
not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands 
of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance ‘interests of the 
highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” (quoting McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978))). 
 87. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 267 n.11 (“Because we construe the statute to conform to the contours of Free 
Exercise jurisprudence with respect to [the similarly situated requirement], we need not reach 
the question whether Congress would have exceeded its powers under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . by mandating maximum-possible favorable treatment for religious 
institutions without regard for legitimate governmental objectives.” (emphasis added)). 
 90. Id. at 283 (Jordan, J., dissenting). Judge Jordan did not decide whether the majority’s 
application of a strict liability standard was proper under all circumstances. Id. at 286 n.34 (“I do 
not think it necessary to decide in this case whether [the Equal Terms provision] imposes strict 
liability under all circumstances because, at least with respect to a zoning ordinance that, on its 
face, treats religious assemblies on less than equal terms, strict scrutiny, no less than strict 
liability, will result in liability.”). 
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that restrictions be imposed equally on religious and nonreligious 
assemblies.91 
Judge Jordan also rejected the majority’s assertion that Congress 
intended to simply “replicate the analysis that would be undertaken 
in addressing a Free Exercise claim.”92 Arguing that a similarly 
situated requirement is unnecessary, he noted that “Congress enacted 
RLUIPA as prophylactic legislation to prevent discrimination against 
churches in the processes of land use regulation,” and that this 
prophylactic legislation falls within Congress’s Section 5 authority.93 
B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach 
The Eleventh Circuit decided three equal terms cases between 
2004 and 2006. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside was the 
first case to interpret the equal terms provision. In Midrash Sephardi, 
a Jewish Orthodox congregation leased property in Surfside’s 
business district.94 The business district permitted theaters, 
restaurants, private clubs, lodge halls, health clubs, and several types 
of schools, but prohibited churches and synagogues.95 The 
congregation applied for a special-use permit and a zoning variance, 
but Surfside denied both.96 The court held that Surfside’s zoning 
ordinance, by permitting secular assemblies such as private clubs and 
lodge halls but prohibiting churches and synagogues, violated the 
equal terms provision.97 
The Midrash Sephardi court rejected a similarly situated 
requirement on the ground that “the express provisions of 
RLUIPA . . . require a direct and narrow focus” and establish the 
“relevant ‘perimeter’” for comparison.98 Thus, the court defined the 
terms “assembly” and “institution” according to their plain meaning 
and found that churches, synagogues, private clubs, and lodge halls all 
fell within the prescribed categories.99 Because Surfside prohibited 
 
 91. Id. at 287. 
 92. Id. at 288 & n.36. 
 93. Id. at 288 n.36 (emphasis added). 
 94. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1219–20 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1235. 
 98. Id. at 1230. 
 99. Id. at 1231. 
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churches and synagogues while permitting private clubs and lodge 
halls, the city violated the equal terms provision. 
As for the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit 
explained100 that the equal terms provision codified the line of 
precedent from Smith and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah.101 Under that line of precedent, the court applies strict 
scrutiny to laws that are not generally applicable or neutral.102 Thus, 
the Midrash Sephardi court concluded that laws violating the equal 
terms provision are subject to strict scrutiny analysis.103 Because 
Surfside’s zoning ordinance was not narrowly tailored to advance its 
proffered interest of “retail synergy,” the court invalidated the 
ordinance and found it unnecessary to determine whether “retail 
synergy” is a compelling interest.104 Finally, the court upheld the 
constitutionality of the equal terms provision as interpreted, declaring 
it a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 authority to remedy and 
prevent discriminatory land-use regulations.105 
The second Eleventh Circuit case, Konikov v. Orange County,106 
involved a zoning ordinance that permitted “single-family homes, 
accessory buildings, home occupations, model homes, and family day 
care homes” but required a special-use permit for other uses, 
including churches.107 The plaintiff regularly held Chabad meetings at 
his home but alleged that secular uses such as family day care homes 
received more favorable treatment under the zoning ordinance than 
his religious use. The court rejected the plaintiff’s facial challenge to 
the zoning ordinance, finding that the code’s unequal treatment of 
family day care homes and churches was narrowly tailored to further 
the county’s compelling interest in “protecting choice in the context 
of the family.”108 The plaintiff also advanced an as-applied challenge, 
alleging that the county enforced the code against social groups 
meeting for religious purposes but not for secular purposes.109 The 
court applied a form of similarly situated analysis to determine, in the 
 
 100. Id. at 1232. 
 101. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1992). 
 102. Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1232. 
 103. Id. at 1235. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1239. 
 106. Konikov v. Orange County, 410 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
 107. Id. at 1320. 
 108. Id. at 1327. 
 109. Id. at 1329. 
CAMPBELL IN FINAL.DOC 3/16/2009  3:22:17 PM 
1092 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1071 
context of an as-applied challenge, whether the code was actually 
being enforced unequally. Noting that “[g]roups that meet with 
similar frequency [to family gatherings and groups such as Boy 
Scouts] are in violation of the Code only if the purpose of their 
assembly is religious,” the court held that the county’s 
implementation of the code violated the equal terms provision.110 
In the most recent Eleventh Circuit case, Primera Iglesia Bautista 
Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County,111 the court of 
appeals identified three types of equal terms violations: regulations 
that facially discriminate; facially neutral regulations that are 
gerrymandered to burden only religious assemblies and institutions; 
and truly neutral regulations that are “selectively enforced against 
religious . . . assemblies or institutions.”112 Clarifying its previous 
holding in Midrash Sephardi, the court indicated that although there 
is no similarly situated requirement for the first two types of 
violations, “[a] plaintiff bringing an as-applied Equal Terms challenge 
must present evidence that a similarly situated nonreligious 
comparator received differential treatment.”113 
*          *          * 
These cases from the Third and Eleventh Circuits reveal sharp 
disagreement over how to properly construct the equal terms 
provision. Both the Third Circuit, in Lighthouse, and the Eleventh 
Circuit, in Midrash Sephardi and subsequent cases, claim 
interpretations that follow the express terms of the statute and carry 
out Congress’s intent.114 But to quell unnecessary doubts about the 
provision’s unconstitutionality, the courts ignored the express terms 
of the statute (or followed them only when convenient), 
 
 110. Id. The court used strict scrutiny analysis but found that “Orange County ha[d] not put 
forth a compelling justification for this lesser treatment.” Id. 
 111. Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 
1295 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 112. Id. at 1308. 
 113. Id. at 1311 (“If a plaintiff offers no similarly situated comparator, then there can be no 
cognizable evidence of less than equal treatment, and the plaintiff has failed to meet its initial 
burden of proof.”). 
 114. See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268 n.13 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“We surmise that the Midrash-Sephardi court required a strict scrutiny 
examination in order that its holding conform to existing Free Exercise case law . . . . However, 
we believe that, unlike the Midrash-Sephardi court, we have come to a constitutionally 
acceptable interpretation of [the equal terms provision], following its express terms, without 
incorporating additional terms into it.”). 
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compromising Congress’s intent. Part III argues that both the 
Lighthouse and Midrash Sephardi approaches are less true to 
Congress’s intent than a textual interpretation of the equal terms 
provision that dispenses with both a similarly situated requirement 
and a compelling interest test. 
III.  THE CASE FOR A TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EQUAL 
TERMS PROVISION 
Only the Third and Eleventh Circuits have explored the contours 
of the equal terms provision at any depth, but neither has reached a 
satisfactory interpretation. Given that other circuits may soon have 
the opportunity to interpret the equal terms provision for the first 
time, this Note argues that courts should interpret the statute 
according to its express terms, which do not include a similarly 
situated requirement or a compelling interest test. 
The Third and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretations appear 
motivated by concerns that a textual interpretation of the equal terms 
provision would exceed Congress’s Section 5 power115 to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment.116 The Midrash Sephardi court upheld the 
constitutionality of its interpretation of the equal terms provision, 
reasoning that “[b]ecause [it] codifies existing Free Exercise, 
Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection rights against states and 
municipalities that treat religious assemblies or institutions ‘on less 
than equal terms’ than secular institutions, [the provision] is an 
appropriate and constitutional use of Congress’s authority under  
§ 5.”117 The Lighthouse court similarly tailored its interpretation to 
 
 115. State and local governments have also argued that RLUIPA violates the Establishment 
Clause. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1240 (11th Cir. 
2004) (evaluating “Surfside’s contention that RLUIPA impermissibly elevates religion in a 
manner contravening the Establishment Clause” and upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality). 
Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether RLUIPA’s land-use provisions are 
permissible under the Establishment Clause, it unanimously upheld RLUIPA’s prisoner 
provisions against an Establishment Clause challenge. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724–25 
(2005). The Establishment Clause argument is beyond this Note’s scope. 
 116. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating 
the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 
195, 216 (2008) (noting that courts have had problems “interpreting RLUIPA because [they] 
have had to choose whether to abide by Free Exercise jurisprudence, or to follow Congress’ 
likely intent to expand religious protection”). Professor Salkin and Ms. Lavine also note that 
“[t]he most obvious challenge to this argument . . . is that RLUIPA was not intended to, and has 
not in practice, replaced constitutional free exercise standards; rather, numerous RLUIPA 
claims are brought in tandem with free exercise claims.” Id. at 217. 
 117. Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1239 (emphasis added). 
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existing Free Exercise jurisprudence because it feared that a more 
expansive interpretation would contravene Section 5.118 
As a longstanding canon of statutory construction, courts may 
give a statute a narrowing interpretation to preserve its 
constitutionality.119 Under the modern incantation of the avoidance 
canon, a court can narrowly construe a statute if the broader reading 
“might be unconstitutional”—the court need not decide that the 
reading “would be unconstitutional.”120 But this canon is subject to an 
important limitation: a court should not construe a statute to avoid 
constitutional problems if the narrower interpretation “is plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress.”121 Here, the lower courts’ use of 
the avoidance canon to reach strained interpretations of the equal 
terms provision is inappropriate for three reasons. First, the lower 
courts’ concerns that a textual interpretation of the equal terms 
provision would exceed Congress’s Section 5 authority —although 
not surprising in light of the Court’s invalidation of RFRA in 
Boerne—are misplaced. Second, the lower courts’ interpretations 
contradict the express terms of RLUIPA, which demonstrate 
Congress’s intent to expand protections for religious liberty. Third, 
the lower courts’ approaches weaken RLUIPA’s protections for 
religious liberty in significant and undesirable ways. 
A. Constitutionality of the Textual Approach 
1. The Nature of Congress’s Prophylactic Power.  By invalidating 
RFRA in Boerne, the Court signaled a strong shift in its approach to 
 
 118. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 267 n.11 (noting that it “need not reach the question whether 
Congress would have exceeded its powers under Section 5 . . . by mandating maximum-possible 
favorable treatment for religious institutions without regard for legitimate governmental 
objectives”). 
 119. See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (describing 
two forms of constitutional avoidance and explaining that the second—what he terms “classical” 
or “modern” avoidance—means that Congress interprets a statute to avoid an interpretation 
that could be unconstitutional). Professor Vermeule distinguishes classical from modern 
avoidance in that classical avoidance “requires the court to determine that one plausible 
interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires only a 
determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional.” Id. The Court articulated 
this canon in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute 
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” (citing NLRB 
v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979))). 
 120. Vermeule, supra note 119, at 1949. 
 121. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575. 
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Congress’s Section 5 power.122 Prior to Boerne, Katzenbach v. 
Morgan123 best articulated the dominant view: “By including § 5 the 
draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision 
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers 
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”124 Boerne rejected 
this view in favor of a more limited Section 5 power, explaining that 
Congress may enforce constitutional rights, but lacks the authority to 
define their meaning.125 Yet—perhaps to avoid another institutional 
clash between the courts and Congress—lower courts seem to have 
forgotten that Boerne also reaffirmed Congress’s power to enact 
prophylactic legislation to “deter[] or remed[y] constitutional 
violations.”126 
Boerne and its progeny show that when Congress legislates 
pursuant to its Section 5 power to prevent or remedy a history of 
constitutional violations, it can do more than merely codify a 
constitutional test.127 Congress can prohibit “a broader swath of 
conduct” than the Constitution itself prohibits.128 In Boerne, the Court 
explained that “[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional 
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power 
even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy 
previously reserved to the States.’”129 To illustrate, the Court pointed 
to congressional bans on otherwise facially constitutional literacy 
tests.130 The Court had upheld the literacy tests’ constitutionality in 
 
 122. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 293–300 (discussing two alternative views of 
Congress’s Section 5 power—the “nationalist” perspective and the “federalist” perspective—
and noting that in Boerne “Congress expressly rejected [the nationalist] view and shifted to the 
federalist perspective”). 
 123. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). 
 124. Id. 
 125. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); see also supra Part I.A. 
 126. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. 
 127. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737–38 (2003) (noting that 
Congress, in exercising its Section 5 power, can do more than simply parrot the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and can even prohibit a “somewhat broader swath of conduct” that is 
not prohibited by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000))); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (“Preventive measures prohibiting certain 
types of laws may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected 
by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.”). 
 128. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)). 
 129. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (emphasis added) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
455 (1976)). 
 130. Id. 
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Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections131 just seven years 
before holding that Congress could ban these literacy tests pursuant 
to its Section 5 power.132 Other examples abound.133 Title VII (which 
applies to state and local governments pursuant to Congress’s 
enforcement power) prohibits practices having a “disparate impact on 
women or minorities,” yet “[t]he Constitution forbids only deliberate 
or overt discrimination in employment.”134 And the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act “redefined sex discrimination to include 
pregnancy discrimination” even though the Court has held that 
pregnancy discrimination does not violate the Constitution.135 
The Court’s post-Boerne Section 5 cases provide additional 
support for Congress’s prophylactic authority, particularly when the 
right sought to be protected warrants heightened scrutiny. In Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,136 for example, the Court 
held that “the States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and 
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of 
leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of 
prophylactic § 5 legislation.”137 Hibbs involved a provision of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act that authorized suits against 
employers—including government employers—that interfered with 
rights granted by the act.138 Upholding the legislation, the Court 
emphasized an important distinction between Hibbs and other cases 
that invalidated similar provisions authorizing suits against the state: 
here, Congress “directed its attention to [a type of discrimination 
that] triggers a heightened level of scrutiny.”139 The Court explained 
 
 131. See Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959) (“We 
cannot say . . . that [literacy tests are] not an allowable [state policy] measured by constitutional 
standards.”). 
 132. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 133. See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 743, 747–59 (1998) (“From 1866 to 1991, Congress repeatedly enacted enforcement 
legislation that went beyond judicial interpretations of the constitutional right being enforced. 
Most of these Acts were upheld or accepted into the fabric of the law without serious 
challenge.”). 
 134. Id. at 752. 
 135. Id. at 753. 
 136. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 137. Id. at 735. 
 138. Id. at 724. 
 139. Id. at 736; see also id. (“Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of 
a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our rational basis test . . . it was 
easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.” (citation omitted)). 
Other post-Boerne cases had found similar provisions authorizing suits against the state to be 
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that when the type of discrimination sought to be remedied warrants 
heightened scrutiny, “it [is] easier for Congress to show a pattern of 
state constitutional violations.”140 
In interpreting RLUIPA’s equal terms provision, the lower 
courts are ignoring Congress’s intent as expressed in the plain terms 
and structure of the statute and reaching unnecessarily strained 
readings. Fretting that the equal terms provision might exceed 
Congress’s Section 5 power if it is interpreted according to its plain 
terms, the Lighthouse and Midrash Sephardi courts have taken 
matters into their own hands, rushing in to save the constitutionality 
of a provision that is already a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 
authority. In the process, the lower courts are making too much of 
Boerne’s admonition that Congress’s Section 5 powers are not 
unlimited, and not enough of Boerne’s reaffirmation that Congress 
can—within its Section 5 power—enact prophylactic legislation 
provided the legislation is a congruent and proportional response to a 
pattern of discrimination. 
2. Constitutionality of the Equal Terms Provision.  A textual 
interpretation of the equal terms provision is constitutional under 
Boerne and its progeny for two reasons. First, Congress demonstrated 
a pattern of religious discrimination that violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provides the basis for enacting prophylactic 
legislation. Second, the equal terms provision, which strictly prohibits 
land-use regulations that treat religious and secular assemblies or 
institutions unequally, is a congruent and proportional response to 
this pattern of discrimination, satisfying Boerne. 
Congress enacted the equal terms provision in direct response to 
reports of discriminatory land-use regulations that would violate the 
 
beyond the scope of Congress’s Section 5 power, but those cases involved age and disability 
classifications. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (invalidating a provision of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (which requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodations for disabled employees) that abrogated state sovereign immunity because 
Congress failed to establish “a pattern of discrimination by the States” and essentially 
“rewr[o]te the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne”); Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (“In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act’s 
substantive requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age 
discrimination by the States, we hold that the [The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967’s abrogation of State sovereign immunity] is not a valid exercise of Congress’ [Section 5 
power].”). 
 140. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736. 
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Fourteenth Amendment.141 Numerous religious leaders and 
constitutional law scholars testified regarding specific instances of 
religious discrimination, including land-use regulations that 
categorically prohibited churches while permitting secular assemblies 
such as theaters and government buildings.142 Land-use regulations 
that make classifications on the basis of religion, such as regulations 
categorically prohibiting churches and other places of worship, are 
subject to strict scrutiny when analyzed under the Equal Protection 
Clause.143 Moreover, Lukumi established that laws burdening religion 
that are not neutral or generally applicable are subject to strict 
scrutiny.144 Many of the land-use laws cited in RLUIPA hearings 
lacked general applicability and neutrality because they prohibited 
religious uses but not similar secular uses, or provided exceptions for 
secular uses without giving exceptions for religious uses.145 Based on 
this evidence, Congress determined that it was appropriate to enact a 
prophylactic measure to prohibit discriminatory land-use regulations. 
Admittedly, a textual interpretation of the equal terms provision 
might prohibit some government regulations that would be 
constitutional if analyzed under free exercise or equal protection 
jurisprudence. For example, a court might find that a regulation 
excluding all tax-exempt assemblies and institutions from its 
downtown district is neutral and generally applicable and therefore 
only subject to rational basis review. In this case, a city’s interest in 
economic development would survive rational basis review. 
Additionally, a textual interpretation of the equal terms provision 
would prohibit the zoning ordinance at issue in Konikov v. Orange 
County, provided a court classified family day care homes as an 
 
 141. See supra Part I.B. 
 142. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
 143. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining 
that legislative classifications based on race, alienage, national origin, or other “personal rights 
protected by the Constitution” are subject to strict scrutiny). Some land-use regulations may 
involve more than one suspect classification. For example, land-use regulations that seek to 
exclude churches with a membership consisting largely of racial minorities could be based on 
both religious discrimination and racial discrimination. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
1998 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 91–92 (statement of John Mauck, Attorney, Mauck, 
Bellande & Cheely, Chicago, Illinois) (describing how a Chicago zoning board denied a zoning 
application for a mostly African-American congregation to use a funeral parlor in a 
predominantly Caucasian part of town as a church). 
 144. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
 145. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18–24 (1999) (describing these laws). 
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“assembly” or “institution” for purposes of the statute, even though 
the Eleventh Circuit found a compelling state interest.146 
That the equal terms provision prohibits some constitutional 
behavior, however, does not mean that it exceeds Congress’s Section 
5 authority. As Hibbs demonstrates, Congress can enact prophylactic 
legislation to prevent or remedy constitutional violations, provided 
the response is congruent and proportional to the harm. Here, 
Congress determined on the basis of extensive testimony that land-
use ordinances frequently discriminate against religious assemblies 
and institutions by treating them less favorably than similar secular 
assemblies and institutions.147 The examples presented to Congress 
were not confined to a particular area of the country.148 Nor was it 
likely that existing constitutional remedies would adequately address 
the harm due to the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination.149 
Thus, Congress determined that a problem of this scope warranted a 
specific prohibition of land-use regulations that treat religious 
assemblies and institutions less favorably than secular assemblies and 
institutions. Given the record of discrimination Congress established 
through hearings leading up to RLUIPA’s enactment, this direct 
prohibition of a specific type of discriminatory land-use regulation is a 
congruent and proportional response under Boerne and its progeny. 
B. Congressional Intent 
The lower courts’ interpretations of the equal terms provision—
in addition to being unnecessary to preserve the constitutionality of 
the statute—are inconsistent with the avoidance canon because they 
contravene Congress’s expressed intent. RLUIPA states that its terms 
“shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, 
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the Act] and the 
Constitution.”150 The express language of RLUIPA and its legislative 
history support an interpretation that dispenses with a similarly 
situated requirement and a compelling interest test in favor of 
broader protection. The express language of the equal terms 
 
 146. See supra Part II.B. 
 147. See supra Part I.B. 
 148. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18 (“The frustration of [religious exercise] is not limited 
to certain religions or to certain areas of land. Churches, large and small, are unwelcome in 
suburban residential neighborhoods and in commercial districts alike.”). 
 149. See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698–99 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. 
Kennedy) (noting that it can be “difficult to prove discrimination in any individual case”). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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provision indicates that Congress was concerned with the differential 
treatment of religious assemblies or institutions compared to secular 
assemblies or institutions.151 Congress defined the appropriate 
comparison group; therefore, courts need not look any further to 
determine if unequal treatment exists. What troubled Congress was 
that “[c]hurches have been denied the right to meet in rented 
storefronts, in abandoned schools, in converted funeral-homes, 
theaters, and skating rinks—in all sorts of buildings that were 
permitted when they generated traffic for secular purposes.”152 The 
proper comparison is between religious and secular assemblies and 
institutions, regardless of the government’s regulatory aims. 
RLUIPA’s text and legislative history also indicate that Congress 
intended to strictly prohibit unequal treatment between secular and 
religious assemblies and institutions. The substantial burden provision 
explicitly provides that land-use regulations that substantially burden 
religious exercise should be evaluated under a compelling interest 
test. The equal terms provision, appearing in the very next section of 
RLUIPA, lacks any similar requirement. Moreover, the act’s 
sponsors indicated that the equal terms provision, as well as the other 
section (b) provisions, “specifically prohibits various forms of 
religious discrimination and exclusion.”153 Representative Canady 
explained that the section (b) provisions “directly address some of the 
more egregious forms of land use regulation, and provide more 
precise standards than the substantial burden and compelling interest 
tests.”154 In sum, the plain terms, structure, and legislative history of 
the equal terms provision argue against both a similarly situated 
requirement and application of strict scrutiny. 
C. Other Approaches Weaken RLUIPA’s Protections for Religious 
Liberty 
The lower courts—in an attempt to quell misplaced concerns 
about the equal terms provision’s constitutionality—have reached 
interpretations that distort Congress’s intent and weaken RLUIPA’s 
 
 151. See id. § 2000cc-3(b) (“Nothing in this chapter shall create any basis for restricting or 
burdening religious exercise or for claims against a religious organization[,] including any 
religiously affiliated school or university . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 152. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. 146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (emphasis added). 
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protections for religious liberty.155 Though both interpretations are 
inconsistent with the express language of RLUIPA, the Lighthouse 
approach poses the most serious problems for religious liberty. 
By requiring plaintiffs to show that a religious assembly or 
institution was treated less favorably than a secular assembly or 
institution that is similarly situated with respect to the regulatory 
purpose, the Third Circuit weakened RLUIPA’s protections for 
religious liberty in two ways. First, it made it more difficult for 
religious groups to prove an equal terms violation. Second, it 
removed the government’s regulatory objectives from judicial 
scrutiny. 
Congress’s decision to codify the appropriate comparison groups 
under the equal terms provision reflects its judgment that land-use 
regulations that differentiate between secular and religious 
assemblies or institutions are inherently likely to discriminate on the 
basis of religion. By statutorily prohibiting this type of unequal 
treatment, Congress removed a large stumbling block that often 
hinders religious groups seeking to challenge these types of laws. If a 
religious group challenged a land-use regulation of this type under 
traditional equal protection jurisprudence, it would have to show not 
only differential treatment, but also that the differential treatment 
was because of religion.156 Discriminatory intent can be extremely 
difficult to prove,157 particularly in the land-use context, in which 
zoning officials can hide behind vague and subjective justifications for 
zoning decisions to mask discriminatory motives.158 The equal terms 
provision allows religious groups to block land-use laws that result in 
differential treatment of religious assemblies as compared to secular 
assemblies without the burden of proving discriminatory intent. 
Unfortunately, the Lighthouse approach makes it more difficult 
for religious groups to prove an equal terms violation than Congress 
intended. The court’s novel test, requiring plaintiffs to show that they 
 
 155. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 116, at 219 (noting that lower courts’ “insistence that 
RLUIPA is a codification of existing constitutional precedent . . . has proven to be troubling, as 
courts interpreting RLUIPA’s poorly defined terms have vacillated between applying precedent 
or applying the statute in the manner conforming to Congress’ perceived intentions”). 
 156. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (explaining that there is no 
equal protection violation without a showing of discriminatory intent). 
 157. See Tuttle, supra note 61, at 921 (“[I]ntentional discrimination is difficult to 
prove . . . .”). 
 158. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (“[O]ften, 
discrimination lurks behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic, aesthetics, 
or not consistent with the city’s land use plan.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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were treated on less than equal terms with a secular assembly or 
institution that is similarly situated with respect to the government’s 
regulatory purpose, allows the government to escape liability simply 
by characterizing its regulatory objective so as to preclude a finding of 
unequal treatment. For example, by defining its regulatory objective 
as promoting nightlife, a city could justify treating churches 
differently than all secular assemblies and institutions because of laws 
prohibiting alcohol sales within a certain distance of houses of 
worship. Similarly, a city could presumably grant affirmative 
protections to churches and then use those privileges as a basis for 
treating churches differently.159 Given that Lighthouse was decided in 
2007, very few cases have applied this interpretation of the equal 
terms provision. Thus, it is unclear whether courts will permit 
plaintiffs to show that a city’s proffered regulatory objective is mere 
pretext. Even if courts do permit a showing of pretext, however, such 
a showing would essentially require plaintiffs to prove intentional 
discrimination. But Congress, recognizing the difficulty of proving 
intentional discrimination in individual cases, sought to eliminate this 
requirement by enacting the equal terms provision. Congress had a 
good reason to do so. Numerous commentators have acknowledged 
the practical barriers to proving intentional discrimination in a given 
case.160 Due to the increased difficulty of proving an equal terms 
violation, the Lighthouse approach will permit zoning boards to get 
away with religious discrimination provided they can come up with 
some permissible regulatory objective that explains their differential 
treatment of religious organizations. 
The Third Circuit’s similarly situated requirement also ignores 
evidence that Congress was specifically concerned not about land-use 
regulations that distinguished between for-profit and nonprofit 
assemblies and institutions, but rather about regulations that 
distinguished between religious and secular assemblies and 
institutions. Congress was well aware when it enacted the equal terms 
provision that local officials often justified disparate treatment by 
explaining that “[they] may not want non-tax-generating property 
 
 159. See Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“Government cannot, by granting churches special privileges . . . furnish the premise for 
excluding churches from otherwise suitable districts.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 755, 781 (1999) (“Supreme Court precedent is skeptical of attempts to prove bad motive, 
even when Supreme Court doctrine requires the attempt.”). 
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taking up space where tax-generating property could locate.”161 Yet, 
the Lighthouse approach would permit precisely that result. Houses 
of worship and tax-generating assemblies such as movie theaters 
would not be similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose of 
generating additional tax revenue. Therefore, a city could exclude all 
tax-exempt assemblies and institutions from a district while 
permitting tax-generating assemblies and institutions without 
violating the equal terms provision. 
A related, but distinct, problem of the Lighthouse approach is 
that it removes a government’s regulatory objectives from judicial 
scrutiny. Because the government’s regulatory objective is wrapped 
into the Third Circuit’s similarly situated analysis, there is no further 
judicial scrutiny once a court finds that no unequal treatment existed. 
Presumably, then, a city could proffer virtually any interest to explain 
its differential treatment, even if that interest would never survive 
strict scrutiny by the courts. To illustrate, a city could claim that its 
regulatory objective is to increase its downtown tax base. Under the 
Lighthouse similarly situated requirement, it would be permissible for 
a city to exclude religious assemblies from the downtown district as 
long as other nonprofit assemblies were excluded as well. The 
regulatory objective—improving the downtown tax base—never 
receives scrutiny. Although a city’s general interest in zoning has 
often been recognized as a compelling interest, more specific 
objectives, such as economic development, have not.162 
The Midrash Sephardi approach is similarly flawed. Like the 
Third Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit makes an equal terms violation 
more difficult to prove by providing an escape hatch to governments 
capable of showing that their unequal treatment of religious 
assemblies is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
government interest. If courts were to apply a rigorous form of strict 
scrutiny—the kind that is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”163—zoning 
boards would rarely be able to demonstrate that the regulation at 
issue is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. In 
that case, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach would not be especially 
problematic. To its credit, the Midrash Sephardi approach has the 
 
 161. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 20 (1999). 
 162. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 116, at 236–38 (“Some courts have held that the general 
interest in enacting and enforcing a comprehensive system of zoning and land use regulation is 
compelling, but others have not.” (footnote omitted)). 
 163. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)). 
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advantage of permitting a government that has a truly compelling 
reason for treating secular and religious uses unequally to escape 
liability. In this sense, the Midrash Sephardi approach may address a 
common criticism of RLUIPA—that it impermissibly interferes with 
local regulatory prerogatives.164 Given this relative advantage of the 
Midrash Sephardi approach over the Lighthouse approach, if courts 
feel compelled to give the equal terms provision a narrowing 
construction because of concerns about constitutionality, imposing a 
strict scrutiny test is at least marginally better than using the Third 
Circuit’s similarly situated requirement. Importantly, though, 
numerous scholars have recognized that when courts applied strict 
scrutiny to burdens on religious exercise before Employment Division 
v. Smith, it was often “strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact.”165 
Thus, there is a risk that courts will apply a less-than-rigorous form of 
strict scrutiny in these religious land-use cases, consequently 
weakening the protections intended by Congress. 
Moreover, the Midrash Sephardi approach seems to discredit 
Congress’s implicit judgment that no permissible reason justifies 
treating religious assemblies and institutions less favorably than 
secular assemblies and institutions. The equal terms provision homes 
in on a very narrow category of land-use regulations that, in 
Congress’s determination, is egregious enough to warrant direct 
prohibition. Even when the Court struck down RFRA as exceeding 
Congress’s Section 5 authority, it emphasized that Congress’s 
determinations as to “what legislation is needed to secure the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment” are “entitled to much 
deference.”166 Adding strict scrutiny analysis that is not invited or 
even suggested by the text or structure of the statute narrows the 
scope of prohibited conduct in contravention of Congress’s intent. 
 
 164. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 331 (2003) (noting 
that there was “significant and vehement opposition to RLUIPA, especially from local and state 
government organizations”). 
 165. Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 
(1992) (noting that the government nearly always prevailed in these cases); see also Note, 
Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2178, 2182, 2188 
(2007) (noting that prior to RLUIPA’s enactment, “religious land use plaintiffs were almost 
uniformly unsuccessful” under a compelling interest test, but arguing that plaintiffs have been 
more successful under RLUIPA’s substantial burden test). 
 166. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The equal terms provision does not prohibit Goldsboro, North 
Carolina, from taking steps to revitalize its downtown district and 
build its tax base. It simply requires Goldsboro to achieve this goal in 
a manner that treats secular and religious assemblies and institutions 
equally. If Goldsboro wishes to exclude churches from its downtown 
district, it must also exclude secular assemblies and institutions. If 
Goldsboro wishes to impose requirements or limitations on land uses 
in the downtown district, it must apply them equally to all assemblies 
and institutions—secular and religious. The Equal Protection Clause 
requires that the “democratic majority . . . accept for themselves and 
their loved ones what they impose on you and me.”167 This is exactly 
what Congress, exercising its legislative authority to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment, intended when it enacted the equal terms 
provision. 
Requiring that religious land uses be treated at least as well as 
similar land uses is one of the most basic guarantees of religious 
freedom. By codifying this guarantee in RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision, and making it easier for religious groups to prove unequal 
treatment, Congress responded in a measured fashion to extensive 
evidence of religious discrimination. The lower courts’ approaches to 
interpreting the equal terms provision seriously distort Congress’s 
intent and weaken RLUIPA’s protections for religious liberty as a 
consequence. Courts should avoid the pitfalls of these interpretations 
by adopting a textual interpretation of RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision. 
 
 167. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
